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Abstract 
Immanent justice reasoning involves causally attributing someone’s bad outcome to their 
prior immoral actions. Building on the idea that causality is mentally linked with spatial 
proximity, we investigated whether such reasoning might lead participants to spatially bind 
together immoral actions and bad outcomes. Across 4 experiments (N = 553 Mechanical 
Turk workers), participants positioned sentences describing other people’s bad (vs. good) 
outcomes closer in space to previous immoral behaviours. This effect was observed both 
when the position of the initial action remained in a fixed location and when it “chased” the 
outcome across the screen. Importantly, we also found that this spatial positioning of 
immoral actions and bad outcomes is mediated by perceived deservingness of the outcome 
and is not merely due to perceived similarity of events. These findings suggest that 
perceived deservingness biases the spatial proximity of representations of others’ random 
bad outcomes and their prior immoral actions.  
 
Keywords: immanent justice; metaphorical thinking; spatial proximity; deservingness; 
perceived similarity  
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Immanent Justice Reasoning by Spatial Proximity 
 
Immanent justice reasoning is the belief that actions bring about deserved outcomes, even 
when there is no physically plausible means by which they might have done so (Piaget, 1932 
Callan, Sutton, Harvey, & Dawtry, 2014). For instance, inferring that a man’s freak accident 
was caused by him having an extramarital affair is reasoning in immanent justice terms 
(Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006). Research suggests that immanent justice reasoning stems, in 
part, from the need to believe in a just world. According to Lerner’s (1980) just-world 
theory, people need to sustain the functional belief that the world is a just, fair, and non-
random place where people get what they deserve. From this perspective, reasoning that a 
random bad outcome was caused by someone’s prior immoral actions allows people to 
maintain the belief that things happen for a reason, and the reason can be found in the 
target’s prior misdeeds—people get what they deserve. Evidence for this account comes 
from research documenting that perceived deservingness underpins people’s immanent 
justice attributions (e.g., Harvey & Callan, 2014) and immanent justice reasoning increases 
when the importance of a just-world to people is heightened (e.g., Callan, Harvey, Dawtry, & 
Sutton, 2013). 
To date researchers have largely investigated immanent justice reasoning by asking 
participants to rate the degree to which they believe a given outcome (e.g., a freak accident) 
was caused by the recipient’s prior moral conduct (e.g., stealing). Bridging empirical and 
theoretical insights from social and cognitive psychology, in the current research we 
examined whether immanent justice reasoning manifests in how people spatially arrange 
representations of others’ immoral actions closer to representations of their fortuitous bad 
(vs. good) outcomes. Theory and research on metaphorical thinking suggests that abstract 
concepts are mentally represented in concrete or physical dimensions such as space and 
time (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010; Thibodeau, Matlock, & 
Flusberg, 2019). Of relevance to the current research, abstract judgements of causal 
strength are often understood in terms of concrete forms of physical closeness (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). This mental association between spatial proximity and causality—that is, 
physical closeness equals causal influence—is established from early repeated encounters 
with mechanical causal relationships in one’s environment (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; 
Michotte, 1963; Rips, 2011; White, 1988). Indeed, when physical events occur closer 
together in space, people are more likely to infer a causal link between them (Michotte, 
1963). The converse is also true: the distance between two moving objects is perceived as 
smaller when the movement of the objects are causally linked than when they are not 
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(Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). Thus, the conceptual metaphorical link between spatial 
proximity and causal strength may result in people arranging immoral actions and fortuitous 
bad (vs. good) outcomes closer together in space, insofar as doing so reflects their 
immanent justice reasoning. 
Overview of research 
In Experiments 1a and 1b, we asked participants to spatially arrange sentences 
describing good or bad outcomes (e.g., winning a lottery ticket or being in a freak accident, 
respectively) either towards or away from descriptions of previous immoral actions (e.g., 
selling drugs). We hypothesized that participants would position bad outcomes closer to the 
perpetrators of immoral actions, reflecting their tendency to construe such outcomes in 
immanent justice terms (i.e., as deserved). Research from Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), however, suggests that, like the metaphorical association between 
causality and physical closeness noted above, “similarity” and “proximity/closeness” are 
closely mapped in people’s minds (e.g., Breaux & Feist, 2008; Boot & Pecher, 2010; 
Casasanto, 2008; Winter & Matlock, 2013). Thus, spatial positioning of immoral actions and 
bad outcomes might reflect conceptual similarity of the events rather immanent justice 
reasoning per se. Indeed, people tend to arrange similar visual and non-visual stimuli closer 
together in space (Goldstone, 1994; Hout, Goldinger, & Ferguson, 2013). Winter and 
Matlock (2013), for example, found that participants positioned stick characters closer 
together when they believed the characters held similar (vs. dissimilar) political views. Thus, 
participants might position morally congruent (vs. incongruent) events closer together in 
space not because they are inferring causality from deservingness but simply because the 
events are conceptually similar (e.g., poisoning one’s dog and contracting an illness are 
conceptually similar because both are evaluatively bad). 
We empirically addressed this alternative explanation in several ways. In our first 
two experiments, we crossed a Person factor (i.e., the outcome occurred to the same or 
different person) with congruency of the outcome. That is, along with congruency, we 
compared whether bad outcomes befell the same person that had behaved immorally to 
when the same negative event befell a different person. Although Frank, for example, might 
deserve a bad outcome because he was immoral, Geoff does not deserve a bad outcome 
because Frank was immoral. Thus, although the value of the actions and outcomes in both 
cases are similar, we expected congruency to affect spatial positioning more strongly when 
the outcome occurred to the person who deserved it (i.e., the same person). Observing such 
a Person X Congruency interaction would help discount conceptual similarity as an 
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explanation for the spatial binding of bad outcomes to bad people: If participants use the 
number of ways the scenarios are similar as cues to determine spatial positioning, then an 
additive rather than interactive model would provide a better fit (i.e., we would observe 
main effects of Person and Congruency but no Person X Congruency interaction). Instead, 
we predicted that the effect of congruency on spatial positioning would be larger when the 
outcome occurred to the person who deserved it. 
In Experiments 2 and 3, we directly examined whether perceived deservingness of 
the outcome underpins the spatial binding of fortuitous bad outcomes to immoral actions. 
In Experiment 2, we examined whether perceived deservingness of a target’s outcome 
mediated the effect of moral congruency of actions and outcomes during the spatial binding 
task used in Experiment 1. Generalizing to a different task involving the movement of shapes 
representing moral and immoral actions and bad outcomes, in Experiment 3 we predicted 
that participants would be more inclined to keep the shapes closer together in space when 
the bad person was “chasing” a bad (vs. good) outcome, and that this effect would be more 
strongly associated with perceived deservingness of the outcome than with perceived 
similarity of the events.  
Sampling 
We recruited participants from the U.S.A. through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for all 
experiments. Except for Experiment 3, Part 2 (see footnote 1), the required sample sizes 
across experiments were determined ahead of data collection; the final sample sizes were 
not completely predetermined due to the unpredictable nature of online recruitment (e.g., 
because of slight over-recruitment and removing participants with duplicate IP addresses). 
We based our sample sizes on achieving at least 80% power to detect small-to-medium 
effects. The data and materials for all experiments are available at osf.io/fb7g5/. We report 
all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. 
Experiments 1a and 1b 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 80 (44 males; Mage= 34.60, SDage = 10.26) and 62 (30 
males, 31 females, 1 preferred not to say: Mage= 34.79, SDage = 11.23) participants for 
Experiments 1a and 1b, respectively. We excluded an additional 3 participants from 
Experiment 1a due to duplicate IP addresses (we retained the earliest response). 
Materials and procedures.  
Experiment 1a. We developed a measure where participants moved two individual 
sentences describing two events of a scenario closer together or further apart in space. 
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There were 8 positions that the sentences could occupy (see Figure 1).  At the beginning of 
each trial, a sentence describing an immoral action occupied the first position and a 
sentence describing a good or bad outcome occupied the fifth position. Participants were 
instructed to, for each trial, click and drag the sentences closer together or further apart 
according to how physically close or far apart the two events felt to them. Each trial was 
scored from 1 (the sentences were placed next to each other) to 7 (the sentences were 
placed as far apart as possible). Prior to the main block, participants completed 1 practice 
trial with neutral sentences (“David took his bicycle to the corner store” and “Ross bought a 
new jigsaw puzzle”). 
Experiment 1b. Experiment 1b was the same as Experiment 1a except that the 
participants could freely move the “outcome” sentence to any position on the screen (cf. 
Goldstone, 1994). The sentence describing the immoral action always occupied a fixed 
position in the centre of the screen. Each sentence was fixed to a black circle positioned 
directly above the middle of the sentence (see Figure 1). For each trial, the starting position 
of the moveable sentence was below the stationary sentence, two-thirds vertically of the 
display-screen. We asked participants to position the circles as close or as far apart as they 
wanted. We calculated the absolute distance between the centre of the screen (the initial 
misdeed) and the position of the moveable ball (the outcome) and divided this by the 
maximum possible distance (i.e., from the centre of the screen to the corner of the screen) 
dependent on each participant’s screen. We then multiplied this value by 100, to give a 
score representing the percentage of the maximum possible distance the two circles could 
be separated.  
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Figure 1. Examples of congruent (left) and incongruent (right) trials/scenarios across 
experiments. The images depict the starting positions of the immoral actions and outcomes 
for each trial. For Experiment 3, the white arrow illustrates the starting path of the red 
circle’s motion once the trial began.  
 
Scenarios and design. The scenarios we used for Experiments 1a and 1b 
represented the conditions of a fully-within 2 (Congruency: morally congruent vs. morally 
incongruent) X 2 (Person: same vs. different) factorial design. In each scenario, the individual 
performed an immoral action. Congruency was manipulated by varying the value of the 
outcome (bad vs. good). For the Person factor, we manipulated whether the outcome 
occurred to the same or a different person by varying the names of the characters within the 
scenarios (e.g., Frank was bad and Frank experienced a bad outcome vs. Geoff was bad and 
Mark experienced a bad outcome). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two sets 
of 8 scenarios (2 scenarios per each condition). The scenarios were the same across sets 
except that the names of the characters changed. Participants responded to the scenarios in 
a random order.  
Results 
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Spatial distances between the behaviors and outcomes were fit with a linear mixed 
effects model using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015, version 1.1-
21) in R (R Core Team, 2019, version 3.6.0). The models included fixed effects for Person 
(different vs.  same, coded -0.5 and +0.5), Congruency (incongruent vs. congruent, coded -
0.5 and +0.5) and the Person X Congruency interaction. We included random intercepts for 
participants and scenarios, and random slopes by participants for the effects of Person, 
Congruency and the Person X Congruency interaction (random effects were uncorrelated 
due to issues with model convergence). We used Satterthwaite approximations to calculate 
p-values using the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2016, version 
3.1-0) and we report 95% percentile bootstrap confidence intervals (2,000 resamples).  
As shown in Table 1, for both experiments there were statistically significant main 
effects of Person and Congruency. More importantly, there were also statistically significant 
Person X Congruency interactions (see Figure 2).  
 
Table 1. Effects of Moral Congruency, Person who Experienced the Outcome, and Moral 
Congruency X Person Interaction on Spatial Distances for Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Predictor b (se) t (df) p-value 95% CI 
Experiment 1a     
Person 
-1.57 
(0.22) 
-7.06 
(27.39) 
< .001 [-1.98, -1.13] 
Congruency 
-1.01 
(0.20) 
-5.01 
(20.22) 
< .001 [-1.40, -0.61] 
Person X Congruency 
-1.16 
(0.35) 
-3.31 
(12.29) 
.006 [-1.82, -0.48] 
Congruency 
(same persons) 
-1.59 
(0.26) 
-6.15 
(15.20) 
< .001 [-2.10, -1.06] 
Congruency 
(different persons) 
-0.43 
(0.25) 
-1.72 
(12.68) 
.11 [-0.88, 0.05] 
Experiment 1b     
Person 
-16.16 
(2.59) 
-6.25 
(15.25) 
< .001 [-20.85, -10.95] 
Congruency 
-15.16 
(2.78) 
-5.46 
(18.72) 
< .001 [-20.57, -9.55] 
Person X Congruency 
-10.84 
(4.60) 
-2.36 
(10.79) 
.038 [-19.75, -1.73] 
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Congruency 
   (same persons) 
-20.59 
(3.55) 
-5.81 
(15.25) 
< .001 [-27.39, -13.34] 
Congruency 
   (different persons) 
-9.75 
(3.34) 
-2.92 
(10.87) 
.014 [-16.05, -3.42] 
Note. Simple effects of Congruency within the Person conditions by experiment are shown in 
italics. 
 
Follow-up analyses by refitting the models using dummy coding revealed that 
participants moved the outcomes closer to the immoral actions when they were congruent 
(vs. incongruent) more strongly when the outcomes occurred to the same persons than to 
different persons (see Table 1). 
 
 
Figure 2. The effect of moral congruency on the distance between the immoral behaviors 
and outcomes as a function of whether the outcomes occurred to the same vs. different 
persons (Experiments 1a and 1b). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals of the mean. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiments 1a and 1b found that participants placed the events closer together in space 
when they were morally congruent (vs. incongruent), and they did so more strongly when 
the outcomes occurred to the same (vs. different) persons. These interaction patterns are 
important because they help discount perceived similarity as an explanation for the spatial 
binding of immoral actions and negative outcomes. If perceived similarity alone was driving 
the patterns we observed, then we would have expected only main effects (i.e., the effects 
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of the manipulations would be additive). Indeed, in a supplementary study, we found that 
when asked to rate the similarity of the scenarios used in these experiments, both the 
Congruency and Person factors influenced similarity, but no interaction between the two 
was observed (see supplementary materials). 
Although these experiments discount perceived similarity as an explanation, they do 
not provide evidence for our assumption that the spatial binding of immoral actions and 
negative outcomes are associated with perceived deservingness. To this end, in Experiment 
2 we asked participants to rate the degree to which they believed a target person deserved 
a good or bad outcome along with completing the spatial binding task from Experiment 1a. 
We predicted that perceived deservingness of the outcome would mediate the effect of 
congruency on the spatial positioning of the action and outcome. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited to complete an online survey (N = 207, 87 
males, 1 unreported; Mage= 36.59, SDage= 12.65). An additional 16 participants were excluded 
due to duplicate IP addresses (n = 5) or failing an attention check item (n = 11).  
Materials and procedure.  Experiment 2 was like Experiment 1a except that 
participants moved sentences for only one of two scenarios and rated the degree to which 
they believed the target deserved the outcome. The sentence associated with the target’s 
immoral action was fixed across conditions: “Frank forcefully raped a co-worker at a 
company retreat”. Varied between-subjects, the sentence associated with the target’s 
outcome involved the performance of his financial investments. In the congruent outcome 
condition, participants read, “Frank’s stocks and shares plummeted, netting him a massive 
financial loss”, whereas participants in the incongruent outcome condition read, “Frank’s 
stocks and shares skyrocketed, netting him a massive financial gain”. Thus, both the target’s 
immoral action and the initial event that generated the outcome were identical between 
conditions—only the value of the outcome varied between conditions. 
Participants moved the sentences as near or far apart from each other as they 
wanted (see top section of Figure 1). Next, participants rated the degree to which they 
believed Frank deserved the outcome (1 = not at all deserving to 7 = very deserving; cf. 
Harvey et al., 2017). Finally, participants completed a multiple-choice attention check item 
(“What happened to Frank’s financial investments?”). 
Results and discussion 
Participants rated the target as more deserving of his outcome when his financial 
investments plummeted (M = 6.26, SD = 1.24) than when they skyrocketed (M = 1.67, SD = 
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1.24), t(198.27) = 24.14, p < .001, d = 3.36 (degrees of freedom were Welch corrected). 
Conceptually replicating Experiment 1a, participants who learned that the target’s stocks 
and shares plummeted (M = 3.61, SD = 2.37) moved the sentences closer together than did 
participants who learned that they skyrocketed (M = 5.52, SD = 2.18), t(203.27) = -6.03, p < 
.001, d = -0.84. 
Perceived deservingness and how close together participants positioned the events 
were significantly correlated (r = -.44, p < .001). We tested the indirect effect of moral 
congruency on distance between events through perceived deservingness using the quasi-
Bayesian Monte Carlo method (5,000 simulations) with the ‘mediation’ package (Tingley, 
Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014; see Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 2010) in R. As shown in 
Figure 3, perceived deservingness significantly mediated the effect of moral congruency on 
spatial distance between events (indirect effect = -1.79, 95% Monte Carlo confidence 
interval: -2.84, -0.75; p = .001). These findings support the hypothesis that participants’ 
spatial binding of bad outcomes to bad people are associated with perceived deservingness. 
This occurred when the same process that generated the outcome (financial investing) led 
to either a fortuitous good or bad outcome for the immoral target, and they replicate our 
findings from Experiments 1a and 1b using a between-subjects design (which is not 
susceptible to carry-over or expectation effects). 
 
 
Figure 3. Mediation model for Experiment 2. Values depict unstandardized regression 
coefficients. ** p < .01. 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 had two key aims: (1) to generalize our previous findings using a different, 
more dynamic spatial positioning task and (2) to test the relative importance of perceived 
deservingness and perceived similarity in the spatial binding of actions and outcomes.    
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One limitation of Experiment 2 is that spatial positioning and perceived 
deservingness were measured simultaneously. It is possible that participants’ ratings of 
deservingness were contaminated by their spatial positioning of the action and outcomes, 
such that participants might have simply inferred the target’s deservingness from how 
physically near or far apart they happened to position the outcome from the action. To 
address this issue, in Experiment 3 participants completed a spatial binding task or provided 
ratings of deservingness; scenarios formed the basic unit of analysis. Specifically, one sample 
of participants completed only a spatial positioning task which included several scenarios 
varying in terms of the moral congruency of the outcomes experienced by the targets. The 
task we used in Experiment 3 was more active and dynamic than the tasks in Experiments 1a 
and 1b, such that participants were asked to keep a “chasing” ball representing a target’s 
immoral behaviour as close or far as they wanted from a ball representing a good or bad 
outcome. A different sample of participants rated the deservingness of the outcomes for the 
targets across the same scenarios used in the spatial binding task (Part 1a), and we explored 
the association between deservingness and spatial binding of outcomes to immoral actions 
at the level of the scenarios.  
 Using scenarios as the unit of analysis allowed us to address two further questions: 
First, we examined whether deservingness per se is associated with the spatial binding of 
bad outcomes to immoral actions or whether perceived similarity between actions and 
outcomes confounds this association. We asked a third sample of participants to rate how 
similar they believed the actions (e.g., drowning a puppy) were to the outcomes (e.g., a 
fractured leg) across the same scenarios used for the “chasing” task (Part 1b). On the one 
hand, if perceived deservingness correlates with the spatial binding of outcomes to actions 
simply because of its association with perceived similarity, then we would not expect 
deservingness to uniquely predict spatial binding over and above the contributions of 
perceived similarity. On the other hand, finding that perceived deservingness uniquely 
predicts spatial binding over and above perceived similarity would suggest that its 
association is not simply due to how conceptually similar people perceive the events under 
question. Second, to provide convergent validity for our spatial binding task as reflecting 
causal attributions, we asked another sample of participants to rate the degree to which 
they believed the outcomes were a result of the targets’ immoral behaviour (Part 1c; cf. 
Callan et al., 2006). 
 Method 
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Participants. We recruited 43 (29 males; Mage= 32.98, SDage= 10.02), 43 (20 males, 1 
non-binary; Mage= 33.37, SDage= 9.90) and 43 (27 males, 1 non-binary; Mage= 33.37, SDage= 
9.90) participants for Parts 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively. For Part 2 (“chasing” binding task), 
we recruited 75 participants (42 males, 1 preferred not to say; Mage= 33.40, SDage= 9.15).1 
Materials and procedures.  
Part 1a: perceived deservingness. For Part 1a, participants responded to 64 
scenarios describing someone engaging in an immoral action (e.g., “Joe robbed a store at 
gunpoint”) and experiencing either a good or bad outcome (e.g., “Joe was in a freak car 
accident”). We used the same 8 immoral behaviors and 8 outcomes (4 good, 4 bad); the 
outcomes were cycled through the 8 immoral behaviors to create 64 individual scenarios. 
For each scenario, participants rated the extent to which they believed the target person 
deserved the outcome that they experienced using a 1 (not at all deserving) to 7 (very 
deserving) scale, which was shown directly below the two sentences describing the action 
and outcome. 
Part 1b: perceived similarity. Part 1b was the same as Part 1a except that 
participants responded to pairings of the actions (“Robbing a store at gunpoint”) and 
outcomes (“A freak car accident”) without mention of who performed the actions or 
experienced the outcomes. This allowed us to gauge perceived similarity of actions and 
outcomes at the conceptual level and in a way that did not imply perceived deservingness of 
the outcome (or lack thereof) for any particular target. For each scenario, participants rated 
the extent to which they believed that the events were similar using a 1 (not at all similar) to 
7 (very similar) scale (cf. Casasanto, 2008).  
Part 1c: perceived causality. For each of the 64 scenarios used in Parts 1a and 1b, in 
Part 1c participants rated the extent to which they believed the outcome was a result of the 
target’s prior immoral behaviour (e.g., “To what extent do you believe that James's stocks 
and shares skyrocketing was a result of him cheating on his wife?”) using 1 (not at all) to 7 (a 
great deal) scale. 
Part 2: spatial positioning. Participants controlled the movements of a circle 
representing the outcome (a white circle) while it was “chased” by a circle representing the 
initial immoral behavior (a red circle; see Figure 1). Both circles started each trial in the 
center of the screen on the vertical plane, and at 30% and 70% of the screen on the 
horizontal plane. Participants pressed one of the arrow keys to move the white circle. The 
 
1 We collected data from 7 additional participants to address imbalances in the number of 
participants completing the different sets of stimuli (see below).  
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circle moved one-step (4% of the screen) every 300ms provided the participant had pressed 
during that time. The red circle moved one-step (2% of the screen size) in the direction of 
the white circle every 300ms. Each trial lasted 15 seconds, and participants could move the 
white circle away from or towards the red circle to keep them as close together or as far 
apart as they wanted. We calculated the distance between the two circles on each sample 
(every 300ms) by taking the mean of their vertical distance and horizontal distance, both 
calculated as a percentage of the maximal distance on each axis. We calculated the average 
distance across the course of the trial by taking the mean distance over each of the 50 
samples.  
Following a practice trial with neutral sentences (per Experiment 1a), participants 
responded to four congruent (e.g., “Joe robbed a store at gun point” and “Joe’s apartment 
was destroyed by fire”) and four incongruent (e.g., “Tim kidnapped a child” and “Tim 
received a major pay rise at work”) scenarios. Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 8 
sets of 8 scenarios. The immoral actions were the same across sets; the differences between 
the sets was that 8 outcomes sentences (4 good, 4 bad) were cycled through the sets such 
that each outcome was paired with each “behaviour” once across the sets. The scenarios 
were presented in a random order across participants.   
Results 
Effects of congruency. Data from each part of Experiment 3 were separately 
submitted to a linear mixed effects model which included a fixed effect for Congruency 
(incongruent vs. congruent, coded -0.5 and +0.5), random intercepts for participants and 
scenarios, and random slopes by participants for the effect of Congruency. As shown in 
Table 1, analyses revealed a statistically significant effect of Congruency for all measures. 
Importantly, participants actively kept the outcome circles closer to the “chasing” immoral 
action circles more when they were congruent (vs. incongruent). 
 
Table 2. Effects of congruency on perceived deservingness, perceived similarity, causal 
judgments, and physical distance during the “chasing” spatial binding task (Experiment 3). 
 
 Congruent Incongruent     
Variable M (SD) M (SD) b (se) t (df) p-value 95% CI 
Perceived 
deservingness 
5.81  
(1.21) 
1.48  
(0.95) 
4.33 
(0.28) 
15.62 
(42.28) 
< .001 [3.79, 4.90] 
Perceived 
similarity 
2.80 
(1.78) 
2.56 
(1.78) 
0.24 
(0.10) 
2.55 
(49.11) 
.014 [0.07, 0.43] 
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Causal 
judgments 
2.86 
(1.62) 
2.03 
(1.55) 
0.83 
(0.19) 
4.41 
(52.68) 
< .001 [0.48, 1.21] 
Physical 
distance 
16.42 
(7.65) 
22.41 
(6.04) 
-6.00 
(0.93) 
-6.47 
(69.71) 
< .001 [-7.78, -4.28] 
 
 Predicting spatial distance from deservingness and similarity. Ratings of the 
predictors were highly reliable across scenarios (all α > .94). As shown in Table 3, with 
scenario as the basic unit of analysis, perceived similarity and deservingness correlated 
significantly with each other, and they each correlated significantly with the distance 
participants actively kept the events away from each other. Providing convergent validity for 
the spatial binding measure, ratings of perceived causality correlated significantly (though 
not perfectly) with physical distance.2 That is, the more participants rated the events as 
causally related, the closer together they kept them during the “chasing” task. 
 
Table 3. Intercorrelations among scenario-level variables (Experiment 3). 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.  
1. Condition  
(0.5 = congruent, -
0.5 = incongruent) 
--    
 
2. Perceived 
Deservingness 
.998* --   
 
3. Perceived 
Similarity 
.60* .59* --  
 
4. Causal judgments .81* .82* .52* -- 
 
5. Physical distance -.75* -.75* -.44* -.71* -- 
Note. N = 64.  * p < .001. 
We tested the unique contributions of deservingness and similarity by fitting the 
distances participants kept the events away from each other with a linear mixed effects 
model which included fixed effects for perceived similarity and perceived deservingness, 
random intercepts for participants and scenarios, and random slopes by participants for the 
effects of perceived deservingness and similarity. Analyses revealed that perceived 
 
2 In an additional validation study, 85 participants completed the “same person” scenarios from the 
task used in Experiment 1a and rated the degree to which they believed the outcome was the result 
of the target’s prior behavior. Consistent with these scenario-level findings, the closer participants 
moved together the actions and outcomes overall, the more they believed the outcomes were a 
result of the target’s prior actions, r = -0.54, p < .001 (see supplementary materials). 
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deservingness, b = -1.36, se = 0.21, CI = [-1.76, -0.94]; t(83.81) = -6.48, p < .001, but not 
perceived similarity, b = 0.43, se = 1.76, CI = [-3.93, 2.93]; t(51.35) = -0.24, p = 0.81, uniquely 
predicted spatial distances during the chasing task. These findings suggest that the role of 
perceived deservingness in the spatial binding of outcomes to immoral actions is not simply 
due to its covariation with the perceived similarity of the actions and outcomes themselves. 
General Discussion 
We found that participants positioned representations of others’ immoral actions and 
fortuitous outcomes spatially closer when the outcomes were perceived as deserved. 
Negative outcomes were positioned closer to previous immoral behaviors than were 
positive outcomes (Experiments 1a to 2), and when controlling the movement of a positive 
or negative outcome that was being “chased” on screen by a bad person, participants kept 
positive outcomes further away from bad people (Experiment 3). This suggests that not only 
did participants position bad outcomes and bad people closer together, they actively tried to 
keep good outcomes away from bad people.3  
Although previous research has documented that people, at times, casually attribute 
others’ random bad outcomes to their prior misdeeds, none of this work specifically tested 
perceived similarity of the events as a potential alternative explanation. We systematically 
addressed this in several ways. First, we found that this spatial positioning bias is 
significantly greater when the two scenarios describe the same protagonist. Although a 
cheating spouse and a car crash victim might be positioned close together because they are 
affectively similar events, this spatial bias is most prominent when the negative event has 
befallen the person (vs. not the person) committing the immoral act. In Experiment 2, we 
extend this finding to show that this spatial bias is explained by the perceived deservingness 
of the outcome. Finally, in Experiment 3 we found that deservingness predicts spatial 
positioning over and above any association with perceived similarity. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that immanent justice reasoning, as measured by spatial proximity, is 
underpinned more by perceived deservingness than by perceived similarity of the events.  
The spatial positioning tasks we developed here may be less susceptible to self-
report bias than explicit causal ratings used in most previous research in this field. In such 
studies, although agreement is greater for morally congruent outcomes (compared to 
 
3 Across our studies we used scenarios involving immoral targets only. From just-world theory, 
however, we should observe the same effects of moral congruency on spatial positioning using 
situations involving moral/good targets (cf.  Callan et al., 2006; Harvey et al., 2017; White et al., 
2019). To this end, in a pre-registered conceptual replication, we found that participants moved 
outcomes closer to moral actions when the outcomes were good (vs. bad; see supplementary 
materials). 
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morally incongruent outcomes), at least Western participants rarely highly agree with 
immanent justice explanations for chance outcomes (e.g. Callan et al., 2006), presumably 
because doing so flies in the face of conventional rationality and meta-physical realism. 
Indeed, raping a co-worker, for example, does not ipso facto cause fluctuations in the stock 
markets, and participants’ explicit causal judgments tend to accord with this lack of physical 
causality. Because the tasks we developed gauge immanent justice reasoning indirectly, they 
may be more suitable in research contexts or among individuals where the motivation to 
suppress the expression of immanent justice explanations is more important. Future 
research in this area would therefore benefit from investigating individual differences and 
situations in which the spatial positioning of moral actions and outcomes might converge 
with other constructs of theoretical importance to immanent justice reasoning, such as 
religiosity, magical ideation, socialization of justice beliefs, and the importance of a just-
world to people (see Callan et al., 2014). Moreover, it is important to highlight that these 
studies were conducted using Western samples which limits the generalizability of our 
findings. Although immanent justice reasoning has been observed in Asian cultural contexts 
(e.g., Murayama & Miura, 2016; White, Norenzayan, & Schaller, 2019), the extent of any 
cross-cultural differences or similarities in immanent justice reasoning by spatial proximity is 
yet to be investigated. 
Conclusions 
The current work suggests that when making sense of people’s immoral actions and 
their ensuing outcomes, people spatially bind together morally congruent events to fit the 
idea that people get what they deserve. This work therefore contributes to theory and 
research on the conceptual metaphorical link between physical closeness and causal 
influence (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and provides new insights into the role that perceived 
deservingness, over and above perceived similarity of actions and outcomes, plays in 
immanent justice reasoning. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR “IMMANENT JUSTICE BY SPATIAL PROXIMITY” 
Supplementary Experiment A: Perceived Similarity 
In Supplementary Experiment A, we examined the potential interactive effect of congruency 
of the outcome (congruent vs. incongruent) and the person who experienced the outcome 
(same vs. different person) on perceived similarity of the events.  
Method 
Participants. Sixty-two participants (63% male: Mage = 31.35, SDage = 6.80) completed 
a brief online survey about people's perceptions of similarity. 
Materials and procedures. Supplementary Experiment A was the same as the main 
Experiment 1 except that instead of moving sentences in space, participants rated the extent 
to which they believed the events described in each of the 16 scenarios were similar (“How 
similar are these two events?”; 1 = not at all similar to 7 = very similar). There were 4 
scenarios for each of the 4 conditions of the fully-within Person X Congruency design. 
Participants saw the behaviour (e.g., “James robbed a convenience store at gunpoint”) and 
outcome (e.g., “Charlie won $100,000 from a scratch-and-win lottery ticket”) sentences 
listed on separate lines, with the rating scale displayed directly below the sentences. The 
scenarios were presented in a random order. Like our main studies, the materials and data 
for all of the supplementary studies are available at osf.io/fb7g5/. 
Results 
Participants’ ratings of perceived similarity were analysed using mixed effects regression as 
per Experiment 1. Analyses revealed main effects for Person, b = 0.35, se = 0.10, 95% CI = 
[0.16, 0.54]; t(28.82) = 3.53, p = .001, and Congruency, b = 0.16, se = 0.08, 95% CI = [0.01, 
0.32]; t(15.23) = 2.00, p = .06. More importantly, as shown in Figure S1, there was no 
significant Person X Congruency interaction, b = 0.01, se = 0.15, 95% CI = [-0.29, 0.32]; 
t(12.38) = 0.08, p = .94. If perceived similarity was accounting for the spatial binding effects 
we observed in Experiments 1a and 1b, then we would have expected to show a similar 
interaction pattern for similarity judgments, whereby the effect of Congruency on perceived 
similarity would have been stronger when the outcome occurred to the same (vs. different) 
person, perhaps because participants were giving more weight to the co-occurrences of 
common features in the scenarios when determining similarity. Instead, these 
supplementary findings suggest that perceptions of similarity follow an additive rather than 
an interactive pattern for this design. 
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Figure S1. The effect of moral congruency on perceived similarity of the events as a function 
of whether the outcomes occurred to the same vs. different persons (Supplementary 
Experiment A). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals of the mean. 
 
Supplementary Experiment B: Perceived Causality and Spatial Closeness 
In Supplementary Experiment B, we sought evidence for the convergent validity of the 
spatial arrangement task used in Experiment 1a. We did so by examining the association 
between ratings of causality and how close together participants positioned the actions and 
outcomes during the task. 
Method 
Participants. Eighty-five participants (53% male: Mage = 35.36, SDage = 11.86) 
completed a brief online survey about people's perceptions of physical closeness between 
events. 
Materials and procedures. Supplementary Experiment B was similar to the main 
Experiment 1a except that along with moving action and outcome-related sentences in 
space, participants rated the extent to which they believed the outcome was a result of the 
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target’s prior immoral behaviour using 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal) scale (cf. the main 
Experiment 3). 
For both the causal judgments and the spatial positioning task, participants 
responded to the “same person” condition only (cf. the main Experiment 3). Half of the 8 
total trials/ratings were congruent and half were incongruent. Participants completed either 
the spatial binding task first or the causal judgments first (randomly determined), and the 
order of the scenarios/trials within blocks was randomized. 
Results 
Participants’ spatial positioning of the sentences and ratings of causality were analysed using 
mixed effects regression as per Experiment 3. Replicating our Experiment 1a effect, 
participants moved the outcomes closer to the immoral actions when they were congruent 
than when they were incongruent, b = -1.06, se = 0.32, 95% CI = [-1.67, -0.46]; t(10.65) = -
3.34, p = .007. Replicating our main Experiment 3 (Part C) and previous research on 
immanent justice reasoning, participants believed the outcomes were a result of the target’s 
prior conduct more when they were morally congruent than when they were incongruent, b 
= 0.84, se = 0.30, 95% CI = [0.28, 1.39]; t(2.82) = 2.82, p = .02. 
 Providing convergent validity for the spatial binding measure as gauging causal 
reasoning, when averaged across scenarios/trials, ratings of causality correlated significantly 
with physical distance, r(83) = -.54, p < .001, such that the more participants believed the 
outcomes were caused by the targets’ prior behaviours, the closer together they positioned 
the actions and outcomes. Fitting the distances participants positioned the actions and 
outcomes during the spatial binding task with a linear mixed effects model including a fixed 
effect for perceived causality, random intercepts for participants and scenarios, and random 
slopes by participants for the effect of perceived causality also revealed a significant 
relationship, b = -0.68, se = 0.05, CI = [-0.78, -0.58]; t(61.31) = -13.43, p < .001. 
Supplementary Experiment C: Spatial Binding of Good vs. Bad Outcomes to Moral Actions 
Across our main studies we used scenarios where the target persons always performed 
immoral actions. In Supplementary Experiment C, we conducted a pre-registered 
(https://aspredicted.org/xb3rr.pdf) conceptual replication of the effects of congruency on 
spatial binding of actions and good vs. bad outcomes using scenarios where the targets 
performed moral actions. Given that people tend to believe that good people deserve good 
outcomes more than they deserve bad outcomes (Callan et al., 2006; Harvey et al., 2017), 
using the spatial binding task from Experiment 1a, we expected that participants would 
position good (vs. bad) outcomes closer to sentences describing moral actions.  
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Method 
Participants. We requested 82 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and 
over- recruited by six participants. The data from four participants were excluded due to 
duplicate IP addresses, leaving a final sample size of 84 participants (55% male: Mage = 33.00, 
SDage = 9.24). 
Materials and procedures. Supplementary Experiment C was similar to the “same 
person” condition in the main Experiment 1a except that participants moved sentences 
describing good and bad outcomes towards or away from sentences describing moral (i.e., 
good) behaviors (e.g., Frank saved a drowning child”, “Ben mows his elderly neighbor’s 
lawn”; See the top section of Figure 1 in the main text). We followed the design of our main 
Experiment 3 such that participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 8 sets of 8 scenarios 
(there were 64 scenarios in total). The moral actions were always the same across sets; the 
differences between the sets was that 8 outcomes sentences (4 good, 4 bad) were cycled 
through the sets such that each outcome was paired with each moral action once across the 
sets. The scenarios were presented in a random order across participants.  
We therefore had two within-subjects conditions: congruent vs. incongruent outcomes. Like 
Experiment 1a, participants were asked to, for each trial, click and drag the sentences closer 
together or further apart from each other according to how physically close or far apart the 
two events felt to them. Each trial was scored from 1 (the sentences were placed directly 
next to each other) to 7 (the sentences were placed as far apart as possible). 
 Results 
Following our pre-registered analysis plan, participants’ spatial positioning of the sentences 
were submitted to a linear mixed effects model which included a fixed effect for Congruency 
(incongruent vs. congruent, coded -0.5 and +0.5, respectively), random intercepts for 
participants and scenarios, and random slopes by participants for the effect of Congruency 
(random effects were correlated). Conceptually replicating the effects from our main studies 
involving immoral targets, participants moved the outcomes closer to the moral actions 
when they were congruent (i.e., good) than when they were incongruent (i.e., bad), b = -
1.07, se = 0.25, 95% bootstrapped CI = [-1.57, -0.60]; t(75.74) = -4.27, p < .001. 
 
 
 
